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In uncertain environments, e-tailers learn about the most pro¯table prices through price
experimentation. Indeed, in this electronic environment online retailers can easily experiment
with di®erent prices to o®er to di®erent consumers. Retailers using the Internet as a medium
for commerce can gather a remarkable wealth of information about their existing and potential
customers, and hence better estimate a consumer's reservation price. As Bakos (2001) reports,
technology allows ¯rms to identify and track individual consumers, both within an online store
and across di®erent websites. This leads to the creation and sharing of consumer pro¯les,
matching of consumer identities with relevant demographic information and comparison with the
preferences of similar consumers through various collaborative and content ¯ltering techniques.
Based on such information, the computing power of the Internet retailers' web server can be
used to deploy complex pricebots and algorithms to determine prices to approach ¯rst-degree
price discrimination. Spurred partly by the low menu cost of changing prices on the Internet
and partly as a response to consumer use of price-comparison shopbots, ¯rms are exploring the
idea of personalized prices for goods and services that are currently sold at posted prices.
Personalized pricing requires some knowledge of each consumer's preferences, and an ability
to charge di®erent prices to di®erent consumers. The price o®ered to a consumer whose valuation
for a product is known may be higher or lower than the posted uniform price charged by
¯rms who lack the sophistication to target individual consumers. In this paper, we use the
term personalized pricing, or PP, to refer to technologies that facilitate such ¯rst-degree price
discrimination. A retailer that invests in PP can identify individual consumers, infer consumer
valuations, and determine a consumer's willingness to pay for its product. This retailer can
therefore o®er a personalized price that may provide the consumer greater surplus relative to
the potential surplus from competitors' products.
We develop an analytical game-theoretic framework to investigate the competitive implica-
tions of such personalized pricing technologies (PP). Shaked & Sutton (1982) and Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1986), building on research by Mussa and Rosen (1978), develop duopoly models
of vertical di®erentiation. Moorthy (1988) extends the basic model by incorporating variable
production costs and allowing consumers the opportunity to not buy a product. Our analysis
extends Moorthy's model by allowing that one, or both, ¯rms can observe consumer valuations,
and thereby engage in ¯rst-degree price discrimination.
We ¯rst show that, even though a monopolist makes a higher pro¯t with PP, its optimal
quality is the same with or without PP. However, the monopolist makes a higher pro¯t with
PP. Second, in a duopoly, unless a ¯rm engages in product di®erentiation, information about
1
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or not any of the ¯rms have PP, the outcome is still Bertrand competition, and ¯rms do not
earn any pro¯t. Hence, ¯rms should not invest in this technology unless they can di®erentiate
themselves from competitors.
We then consider a model of vertical product di®erentiation, and show how personalized
pricing on the Internet a®ects ¯rms' choices of quality di®erentiation in a competitive scenario.
First, if the ¯rm with PP has a low quality, its optimal price is non-monotonic in consumers'
willingness to pay. That is, some high valuation consumers are o®ered lower prices than some
low valuation ones. Second, when one ¯rm adopts PP, the other ¯rm responds by lowering its
price. This is a competitive response: a ¯rm with PP knows the valuation of each consumer, and
can therefore charge prices as low as its own marginal cost to a speci¯c consumer. It therefore
encroaches into the market share of the other ¯rm, which responds to the increased competition
by reducing its price.
Third, when only one of the ¯rms adopts PP, it is optimal for it to increase product di®er-
entiation. While it is optimal for the ¯rm adopting PP to increase product di®erentiation, the
non-PP ¯rm seeks to reduce di®erentiation by moving in closer in the quality space. Fourth, we
¯nd that, when the PP ¯rm has a high quality both ¯rms raise their qualities, relative to the
uniform pricing case. Conversely, when the PP ¯rm has low quality, both ¯rms lower their qual-
ities. PP provides the low quality ¯rm with an opportunity to penetrate an untapped market
segment further to the left than where it presently is. Hence it lowers its quality to extend its
reach in the direction of decreasing consumer type. As a competitive response to di®erentiate
itself, the high quality ¯rm initially moves to the right as long as moving away is relatively
inexpensive due to low convexity of its costs. But when the costs start increasing at a much
faster rate, the potential loss per unit of market share on the right is outweighed by the gains
from moving to the left.
Fifth, depending on the convexity of the marginal cost function, we outline the incentives of
¯rms to deploy such technologies. Our model shows it is an optimal strategy for the low quality
¯rm to adopt PP, if the other ¯rm does not. Regardless of whether the low quality ¯rm has PP,
the high quality ¯rm should adopt PP only if the cost function is not too convex. Sixth, if both
¯rms acquire PP, then both ¯rms earn lower pro¯ts than in the case where neither ¯rm has PP.
Essentially, they are trapped in a prisoner's dilemma.
Finally, consumer surplus falls (compared to the no PP case) if the PP ¯rm has low quality,
but rises if the PP ¯rm has high quality. In fact, consumer surplus is highest when both
¯rms have PP. This is due to the fact that since both ¯rms can now price at marginal costs.
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Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011Thus this leads to the case of maximum market coverage and most intensi¯ed price competition.
Thus, despite the threat of ¯rst-degree price discrimination, personalized pricing with competing
¯rms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare. Thus our analysis o®ers interesting
strategic insights for managers about how to address the competitive problems associated with
personalized pricing and quality choices.
Keywords: Vertical Di®erentiation, Personalization, Price Discrimination, Electronic Com-
merce
6 Review of Marketing Science Working Papers Vol. 2 [2002], No. 1, Article 3
http://www.bepress.com/roms/vol2/iss1/paper31 Introduction
In uncertain environments, e-tailers learn about the most pro¯table prices through price experi-
mentation. By its very nature, the Internet is well adapted to such a learning process. Indeed, in
this electronic environment the menu costs of changing prices are negligible, and sellers can easily
experiment with di®erent prices to o®er to di®erent consumers. In the near future, ¯rms will have
the wherewithal to use the waves of personal pro¯le and consumer and supplier activity data to
set personalized prices. The state of the e-tailing industry now has put the consumer is in control.
He is able to surf from site to site to compare prices, or even use automated agents that ferret out
the lowest prices, playing merchants against each other and forcing prices into the cellar. Such a
situation may render the prevailing \one price ¯ts all" model obsolete.
Interestingly, the Internet is a double-edged sword. Retailers using the Internet as a medium
for commerce can also gather a remarkable wealth of information about their existing and potential
customers, and hence better estimate a consumer's reservation price. As Bakos (2001) reports,
technology allows ¯rms to identify and track individual consumers, both within an online store and
across di®erent websites. This leads to the creation and sharing of consumer pro¯les, matching of
consumer identities with relevant demographic information and comparison with the preferences
of similar consumers through various collaborative and content ¯ltering techniques. Based on
such information, the computing power of the Internet retailers' web server can be used to deploy
complex pricebots and algorithms to determine prices to approach ¯rst-degree price discrimination
(Bailey, 1998). Spurred partly by the low menu cost of changing prices on the Internet and partly
as a response to consumer use of price-comparison bots, ¯rms are exploring the idea of personalized
prices for goods and services that are currently sold at posted prices.
Personalized pricing requires some knowledge of each consumer's preferences, and an ability to
charge di®erent prices to di®erent consumers. The price o®ered to a consumer whose valuation for
a product is known may be higher or lower than the posted uniform price charged by ¯rms who
lack the sophistication to target individual consumers. In this paper, we use the term personalized
pricing, or PP, to refer to such ¯rst-degree price discrimination. A retailer that invests in PP can
identify individual consumers, infer consumer valuations, and determine a consumer's willingness
to pay for its product. This retailer can therefore o®er a personalized price that provides the con-
sumer greater surplus relative to the potential surplus from competitors' products. If the retailer's
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algorithm will increase the price for that consumer and vice versa.
There are many recent examples of personalized pricing among online retailers. In 1998-99,
Books.com adopted a price discrimination strategy where di®erent buyers were paying di®erent
prices for the same item based on their shopping behavior. A well-known example, of course, is
Amazon.com, which varied prices to di®erent consumers on its popular Diamond Rio MP3 player
by up to $50 from the original $233 retail tag (Morneau, 2000). Later on, over a ¯ve-day period,
Amazon o®ered discounts of twenty to forty percent o® the list price on 68 of its 100 most popular
DVD titles, which again di®ered by consumers. This promotion resulted in the same title being
sold at a price ranging from $24 to $39.
One way for a retailer to engage in price discrimination is through intelligent agents dynamically
inserting personalized discounts on pop-up windows on a consumer's screen. Software for this is
provided by, among others, iChoose, Dash, and zBubbles (Johnson, 2000). Chen & Iyer (2001)
report that, in the North American long-distance telephone market, the major competitors (AT&T,
MCI and Sprint) have been able to improve the sophistication of consumer databases that helps
them to provide specialized discounts to a majority of the population. Further, Ford plans to move
towards pricing its automobile ¯nancing products dynamically, based on consumer pro¯les and
choices, and expects to cut its $10 billion spending on non-targeted promotions signi¯cantly (Aron,
et al., 2001).
E-tailers are now using data-mining software and click-stream analysis products to track con-
sumer behavior.1 Of late quite a few software companies have begun to o®er personalized pricing
within e-commerce products. Calico's Dynamic Custom Price application enables sellers to o®er
personalized prices (www.calico.com). Zilliant software provides online businesses with real-time
feedback on consumer behavior and competitive pricing to support personalized pricing decisions.
Many ¯rms believe that the concept of making the right o®er to the right consumer will be
the way of the future. In this paper we intend to examine the following questions. How does
competition between online retailers, in the presence of intelligent agents and price bots that can
extract buyer preferences and implement personalized pricing, a®ect equilibrium outcomes in a
1NetGenesis' NetAnalysis, for example, gleans behavioral data from Web server log ¯les, a network sni®er (software
that sits on the network and logs tra±c) and from Web server plug-ins.
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the quality of value added services bene¯t from personalized pricing and what are the incentives for
investing in such technologies for competing ¯rms? Does the improvement in ¯rms' knowledge of
individual consumers alleviate the pricing pressure on retailers or does it intensify price competition
in the industry such that all competing ¯rms become worse o®?
We consider these questions in a duopoly framework in which one or both ¯rms can perfectly
identify valuations of heterogenous consumers.2 Recent work on price discrimination and customiza-
tion includes Ulph and Vulkan (2001), who ¯nd that a ¯rm that ¯rst-degree price discriminates is
also better o® if it mass-customizes. In a monopoly setting, Aron, et al., (2001) analyze the pricing,
pro¯tability and welfare implications of agent-based technologies that engage in pricing based upon
product preference information revealed by consumers. In the context of consumer addressability,
where ¯rms can reach individual customers, Chen and Iyer (2001) ¯nd that when product di®er-
entiation and the cost of incremental addressability become small, ¯rms strategically di®erentiate
in their choice of addressability to mitigate destructive competition. Chen, et al., (2001), have
shown that mistargeting can soften price competition in the market, and qualitatively change the
incentives for competing ¯rms engaged in individual marketing.
We derive a number of analytical results on ¯rm pricing and quality di®erentiation, and on
consumer welfare, when one or both ¯rms have PP. First, the optimal quality for a monopolist is
the same with or without PP. However, the monopolist makes a higher pro¯t with PP. Second, in a
duopoly, unless a ¯rm engages in product di®erentiation, information about consumer preferences
and valuations by itself does not provide any strategic advantage. Whether or not any of the ¯rms
have PP, the outcome is still Bertrand competition, and ¯rms do not earn any pro¯t. Hence, ¯rms
should not invest in this technology unless they can di®erentiate themselves from competitors.
Third, if the ¯rm with PP has a low quality, its optimal price is non-monotonic in consumers'
willingness to pay. That is, some high valuation consumers are o®ered lower prices than some
low valuation ones. Fourth, when one ¯rm adopts PP, the other ¯rm responds by lowering its
price. This is a competitive response: a ¯rm with PP knows the valuation of each consumer, and
can therefore charge prices as low as its own marginal cost to a speci¯c consumer. It therefore
2This assumption is made in order to provide benchmark results. Future potential notwithstanding, current
technologies can only approximately determine consumer valuations.
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by reducing its price. Fifth, when only one of the ¯rms adopts PP, it is optimal for it to increase
product di®erentiation. This can be interpreted as a move to reduce competition with the other
¯rm.
In addition to the above results, for a wide range of cost parameters, we demonstrate some
properties of ¯rm pro¯t and consumer surplus with PP. First, within this range, it is a dominant
strategy for the low quality ¯rm to acquire PP. That is, regardless of whether the high quality ¯rm
acquires PP or not, the low quality ¯rm makes a higher pro¯t with PP. Conversely, the high quality
¯rm should acquire PP only if the costs of quality are not too steep. Next, if both ¯rms acquire PP,
then both ¯rms increase pro¯ts (if costs are not too convex). However, if marginal costs sharply
increase in quality, then both ¯rms earn lower pro¯ts compared to the case where neither has PP.
Essentially, they are trapped in a prisoner's dilemma.3 Finally, consumer surplus falls (compared
to the no PP case) if the PP ¯rm has low quality, but rises if the PP ¯rm has high quality. In fact,
consumer surplus is highest when both ¯rms have PP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model in detail and analyzes
a monopolist's choices. Section 3 provides the intuition behind why ¯rms would sell heterogeneous
products and thus lays the groundwork for further analysis of quality based competition. Section 4
presents a preliminary result that acts as a benchmark for comparative statics. Section 5 considers
the cases of the PP ¯rm choosing a low and a high quality respectively. That is, we consider two
equilibria, with the PP ¯rm being the lower quality ¯rm in one equilibrium, and the higher quality
¯rm in the other.4 We then proceed to Section 6 to analyze the equilibrium when both ¯rms
have PP. In Section 7 we provide some interesting observations using numerical analysis. We then
discuss some implications of our ¯ndings, with some concluding remarks in Section 8. All proofs
are relegated to the Appendix in Section 9.
3Sha®er and Zhang (1995) had a similar result in their model of coupon targeting.
4We do not consider the question of which equilibrium will emerge. In our model, neither ¯rm has the option of
forcing the other into a particular equilibrium.
4
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We consider vertical di®erentiation in a personalized pricing context. Shaked & Sutton (1982) and
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986), building on research by Mussa and Rosen (1978), develop duopoly
models of vertical di®erentiation.5 These papers have shown that the strategic e®ect of the desire
to reduce price competition results in a product equilibrium where ¯rms seek maximal product
di®erentiation. Moorthy (1988) extends the basic model by incorporating variable production costs
and allowing consumers the opportunity to not buy a product. This results in less than maximal
product di®erentiation.
Firms compete in both the quality and price of the products they o®er. Formally, we model
their competition as a three-stage game. At the ¯rst stage, ¯rms simultaneously choose the quality
levels of their products. At stage 2, the two ¯rms simultaneously choose their prices. Finally, at
the last stage, consumers decide which, if any, product to buy.
Our analysis extends Moorthy's model by allowing that one, or both, ¯rms can perfectly observe
consumer valuations, and thereby engage in ¯rst-degree price discrimination. Consistent with his
model, whether ¯rms have PP or not, the pure strategy equilibria are characterized by one ¯rm
choosing a high quality (call this ¯rm h), and the other one a low quality (call this ¯rm `).
Consumers are modelled as utility maximizers. If a consumer purchases a product of quality q
at price p, his utility is U(µ)=µq¡p,w h e r eµ 2 [0;1]. A consumer has positive utility for one unit
only. The type parameter µ indicates a consumer's marginal valuation for quality. For any given
quality, a consumer with a higher µ is willing to pay more for the product than one with a lower µ.
If either of the two products o®ers a positive net utility, a consumer buys the one that maximizes
his surplus. Otherwise, he chooses not to buy either product. As a benchmark, we consider the
case of ¯rms setting a single posted price (which we call \uniform pricing") at stage 2. We then
examine outcomes under personalized pricing (PP), or ¯rst-degree price discrimination.
Consistent with prior literature, we assume that ¯rms have a marginal cost for production which
is invariant with the quantity, but depends on the quality of the product. That is, both ¯rms have
the same cost function, but, depending on the quality levels they choose, their marginal costs may
5Armstrong & Vickers (2001) provide an elegant framework that incorporates much of the earlier work on price
competition in an environment with multiple ¯rms. In a model of horizontal di®erentiation, Bhaskar & To (2002)
¯nd that, with perfect price discrimination and free entry, there is excessive entry.
5
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Assumption 1 (i) Each ¯rm has a constant marginal cost for producing the good, denoted by c.
(ii) c(¢) is twice di®erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex in q.T h a t i s , c0 > 0 and
c00 > 0.
Quality in this model is a broad notion that encompasses any features that may a®ect a con-
sumer's willingness to pay for a good. These could include features intrinsic to the product itself
(such as durability and functionality) and those related to the quality of the online shopping expe-
rience or the service level provided by the ¯rm (such as warranties, delivery times, and consumer
service). Quality is observed perfectly by all consumers at no extra cost.
Although cross-merchant product comparisons are a threat to merchant pro¯tability, they are
characteristic of the retail marketplace and are here to stay. Knowing this, retailers add value
to manufacturers' products to distinguish themselves from their competitors. These value-added
services include extended warranties, forgiving return policies on defective items, special gift ser-
vices, superior customer service and support contracts, fast delivery times with low costs, cross-
manufacturer product con¯gurations, and so on. Depending on the product, these value-added
services can be critical to a consumer's buying decision regardless of the manner of shopping.
Given the quality levels and prices o®ered by the two ¯rms, consumers make their choices.
Suppose, in the benchmark case of uniform pricing, ¯rm 1 o®ers (q1;p 1), and ¯rm 2 o®ers (q2;p 2).
There will be a subset of consumers (possibly null) who buy from each of ¯rms 1 and 2. The pro¯t
of ¯rm j is its market coverage times (pj ¡ c(qj)). In the case of PP, we allow one or both ¯rms
to be equipped with a technology that perfectly reveals the consumer's type before the price is
disclosed to the consumer. While the ¯rm o®ers the same quality product to all consumers, it can
choose a customized price, and hence engage in ¯rst-degree price discrimination. In this case, a
¯rm's pro¯t from consumer µ is (p(µ) ¡ c(qj)).
In practice, a personalized pricing technology of this nature is likely to incur some ¯xed costs.
Most such technologies involve developing software to employ intelligent agents to infer consumer
valuations, as well as algorithms to provide personalized prices based on the estimated valuations.
However, such costs are independent of the quality of the product being o®ered by the ¯rm, and
hence are ¯xed costs when considering the ¯rm's choice of quality. For simplicity, in this model,
6
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results. However, depending on the nature of the variable costs, we provide guidelines as to when
¯rms should or should not invest in PP.
We consider pure strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of this three-stage game. That is, for any
strategies the ¯rms may choose at stages 1 and 2, consumers behave optimally at stage 3. Firms,
in turn, not only anticipate this behavior, but also choose optimal prices, given quality levels, at
stage 2. Before considering the duopoly case, we ¯rst consider the e®ect of PP on a monopolist's
choice of quality.
2.1 Monopoly Case
Consider ¯rst, a monopoly with uniform pricing. Let qn
m and pn
m be the quality and price, respec-
tively, o®ered by the ¯rm in this case where the superscript n refers to the fact that the ¯rm does






consumers with types µ ¸ µn
m will buy the product (because this leads to higher utility than not
consuming) and those with types µ<µ n










m as the quality level and price, respectively, o®ered by a monopolist with
PP where the superscript d denotes the fact that the monopolist has PP technology. Since this
¯rm observes consumer types before choosing its price, pd
m will be a function of consumer type, µ.
Since marginal cost is constant in sales volume, a product sold to one consumer will have no e®ect
on the price to any other consumer. Hence the ¯rm charges each consumer his entire surplus from
consuming the good. That is, pd
m(µ)=µqd
m. This price function is, trivially, increasing in µ:h i g h e r
consumer types pay higher prices.
Further, the ¯rm is willing to price as low as marginal cost, c(qd
m) to persuade a consumer to





m .A l lt y p e s
higher than µd
m buy the product, and pay the price pd
m(µ)=µqd
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quality. This result immediately implies that a monopolist with PP earns a higher pro¯t than a
monopolist without PP. In fact, at the same quality, a monopolist with PP will achieve a higher
market share than one without PP. The ability to customize prices according to consumers' will-
ingness to pay ensures that the ¯rm is now able to reach many more consumers than it could
before.
Proofs for Proposition 1 and all other Propositions, are provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, regardless of PP, a monopolist sets the same quality level: qd¤
m =
qn¤
m .F u r t h e r ,¼d
m =2 ¼n
m:
Increasing (decreasing) quality implies a trade o® between increasing (decreasing) costs and
decreased (increased) market penetration for the ¯rm. Personalized Pricing gives it the ability
to reach a previously untapped portion of the market, without changing its product quality. By
pricing at marginal cost for the threshold consumer, the ¯rm ensures that it is able to penetrate an
additional market segment without incurring additional costs. This case provides a benchmark to
the one in which one of two duopolists obtains a PP technology. As we show in the next section,
in the latter case, qualities of both ¯rms typically change in response to the availability of PP.
3 Duopoly with personalized pricing: No Quality Di®erentiation
We next turn to the duopoly case, with two ¯rms in the market. We ¯rst show that the ability to
price discriminate, by itself, is of no value unless ¯rms also di®erentiate in quality.
Suppose that one or both ¯rms have access to PP. Suppose the two ¯rms have products of
identical quality, so that q1 = q2. Then, regardless of access to personalized pricing, Bertrand
competition is inevitable, and each ¯rm earns zero pro¯t.
Proposition 2 Suppose both ¯rms o®er the same quality, so that q1 = q2. Then, in equilibrium,
regardless of the availability of PP, p1 = p2 = c(q1),s ot h a te a c h¯ r me a r n sz e r op r o ¯ t .
Thus, even when one of the ¯rms possesses a technology of extracting consumer valuations
and pricing accordingly (PP), it does not have any competitive advantage in the absence of some
8
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in personalized pricing, unless they can also provide value-added services to di®erentiate their
product. Without product di®erentiation, retailers are reduced to competing at marginal cost, and
are unable to earn a pro¯t. We therefore turn to the case in which ¯rms ¯rst choose the quality of
their product, and then the price.
4 Di®erentiated Duopoly: Neither Firm has PP
As a benchmark case, we ¯rst assume that neither ¯rm has access to PP. We call this case the
no-PP case. As Moorthy shows, in any pure strategy equilibrium, the ¯rms choose di®erent quality
levels. This feature continues to prevail when one or both ¯rms have PP. As we have shown, if ¯rms
choose the same quality, both ¯rms earn zero pro¯t. Hence, each ¯rms prefer quality di®erentiation,
regardless of whether it has higher or lower quality than the other.
When there is no access to PP, ¯rm i,( i = h;`), chooses a quality qn
i and price pn
i ,w h e r e









Henceforth the superscripts l;h and b will indicate the scenarios when only one ¯rm has PP and
the PP ¯rm chooses low quality or high quality or when both ¯rms have PP.
The subgame-perfect equilibrium in this case is determined by backward induction, starting
with stage 3. As shown by Moorthy (1988, Proposition 1, part 3), in equilibrium at stage 3, the
¯rms share the market in the following manner.6 Consumers with valuations greater than a cuto®
level µn
h and less than 1 purchase product h, and those with valuations between a second cuto® level
µn
l and µn
h purchase product `. µn
h is de¯ned by the consumer exactly indi®erent between products
h and `,a n dµn


























T h i ss i t u a t i o ni sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e1b e l o w .
6Though Moorthy assumes quadratic costs, this result depends only on consumer preferences, and not on costs.
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Buy product h Buy product ` Buy neither product
Figure 1: Consumers' purchasing decision by consumer type (µ)
4.1 Price Competition at Stage 2





` ) ,a n dt h a to f¯ r m
h as ¼n
h =( 1¡ µn
h)(pn
h ¡ cn
h). Now, consider stage 2 of the game, after ¯rms have chosen their
respective qualities, qn
h and qn




` ). We solve for the prices chosen by
the ¯rms at stage 2.



























Given these prices, we now consider ¯rms' choices of quality levels at stage 1.
4.2 Quality Competition at Stage 1
At this stage, ¯rms anticipate the prices they will choose at stage 2 (as a function of the qualities
chosen at stage 1), and their resulting pro¯ts at stage 3. Pro¯ts for each ¯rm are hence written
as a function of quality levels qn
h and qn
` alone. Denote these pro¯t functions as ¼n
h and ¼n
` .I n
particular, suppose ¯rm h chooses a quality qn
h
¤, and ¯rm ` chooses qn
`






































= 0, de¯nes a reaction function for ¯rm h; i.e., it
determines the optimal quality level of ¯rm h as a function of qn
` . Similarly, the ¯rst-order condition
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¤, are determined by simultaneously solving these two equations.
In the next section, we consider the case in which one ¯rm has PP, and compare the resulting
quality levels to this benchmark case.
5 Duopoly with personalized pricing: Only one Firm has PP
We now consider the situation in which one ¯rm has access to PP i.e., it can infer consumer
valuations and form a perfect estimate of each consumer's willingness to pay for its product. As
Proposition 2 suggests, there is no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium in which both ¯rms
choose the same quality level, since this results in zero pro¯ts for both. Instead, each ¯rm prefers
to have a di®erent quality (either higher or lower). Hence, there are two equilibria in this case; one
in which the PP ¯rm chooses a lower quality than the other ¯rm, and a second one in which the
PP ¯rm chooses a higher quality. We consider each of these equilibria in turn.
5.1 PP Firm O®ers Low Quality








¤(µ)d e n o t i n gt h e
equilibrium prices. In this case, ¯rm ` knows the type of each consumer, and hence can o®er prices
that depend on µ. In equilibrium, it must be willing to o®er a price as low as its marginal cost,
c`
` = c(q`
`), to each consumer, if necessary. Further, consistent with price discrimination, it will
charge as high a price as it can from each consumer it sells to. As before, we solve this game by
backward induction. At stage 3, ¯rm h (which does not have PP in this case) will operate in a
market segment [µ`
h;1], and ¯rm ` in a market segment [µ`
`;µ`
h].
Consider ¯rst the location of the marginal consumer µ`
h, who is indi®erent between buying from
either ¯rm. This consumer must obtain the same utility from either product. If p`(µ`
h) >c `
`,t h e n
¯rm ` would lower its price for this consumer, to ensure that he strictly prefers to buy product `.
Hence, it must be that p`(µ`
h)=c`

















` is de¯ned by the consumer who is indi®erent between buying product ` and not
c o n s u m i n ga ta l l .A g a i n ,i tm u s tb et h a tp`
`(µ`
`)=c`
`,e l s e¯ r m` could increase its pro¯t by reducing
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We show that the equilibrium price function of ¯rm ` is non-monotonic in consumer type; that
is, it charges some high valuation consumers less than it charges some low valuation consumers.













`).F o rc o n s u m e r s
in the range [µ`
`;^ µ],¯ r m` sets p`
`(µ)=µq`
`, and for those in the range (^ µ;µ`































¾ - ¾ -
6
Firm `0s market Firm h0s market
Prices of `;h
Figure 2: Prices of ¯rms ` and h when ¯rm ` alone has PP
The intuition for the non-monotonicity of p`
`
¤(µ), is that in the market segment [0;^ µ], ¯rm `
faces no competition from ¯rm h. These consumers are not willing to buy product h at the o®ered
quality and price. Hence, ¯rm ` is able to extract their entire consumer surplus, and consumers
in this range are left with no surplus. However, consumers in the range [^ µ;1] obtain a positive
utility from consuming product h as well. Hence, ¯rm ` faces competition in this range, and must
o®er consumers at least as high a surplus as ¯rm h, to induce them to buy product `.T h u s ,t h e s e
consumers have a positive surplus that is monotonically increasing in consumer type.
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`)i fµ 2 (^ µ;µ`
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(1)
Now, consider the choice of qualities at stage 1. Suppose ¯rm ` chooses q`,a n d¯ r mh chooses qh.
Further, suppose ¯rm h chooses p`
h optimally (as given by Proposition 1), given the two qualities.









































= 0. Recalling that p`



























=0 ( 3 )
Let Ã`(q`
h;q`















(since c(¢) is convex), the optimal quality q`















`)) = 0: (4)
The solution to this equation yields the reaction function of ¯rm `.D e n o t et h i sb yr`
`(q`
h).










































2 =0 ( 5 )
Let Ãh(q`
h;q`
`) denote the left-hand side of this equation.
Since q`
h >q `




`) = 0. Hence, the optimal quality of ¯rm h,
q`








h)0 =0 : (6)
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`), the solution to this equation, denote the reaction function for ¯rm h.
Denote (c`
h)0 = c0(q`
h)a n d( c`
`)0 = c0(q`
`). First, we show that, each of these derivatives must be
that less than 1 in equilibrium. This will be useful in showing properties of the reaction and pro¯t
functions in the next two results.
Lemma 2 At the equilibrium qualities,(c`
h)0 < 1,a n d(c`
`)0 < 1.
We can now demonstrate that the reaction functions of both ¯rms are upward sloping. That
is, if ¯rm ` increases its quality, ¯rm h should raise its quality, and vice versa.











We show that, when ¯rm ` acquires PP, the competitive response of ¯rm h is to reduce its
price. PP allows ¯rm ` to price as low as marginal cost to a particular consumer, to induce him to
buy product `. This leads to an immediate increase in the market share of ¯rm `,b o t ha m o n g s t
low valuation consumers, and those who were previously buying product h.I n r e s p o n s e t o t h i s
heightened competition from ¯rm `,¯ r mh reduces its price. This response of ¯rm h, in turn,
induces ¯rm ` to lower its own quality, to reduce the competition with ¯rm h.
Proposition 5 Suppose both ¯rms o®er the no-PP qualities, qn
h;qn
` .I f ¯ r m ` now acquires PP,
compared to the no-PP case, (i) ¯rm h charges a lower price: p`
h <p n
h, and (ii) if ¯rm h remains
at its original quality, qn
h,t h e n¯ r m` lowers its quality.
Of course, in equilibrium, both ¯rms change their qualities from the no-PP case. We expect the
price of ¯rm h to be lower, and the quality of ¯rm ` to be lower. What quality does ¯rm h choose?
Observation 1 Given a cost function of the nature c(q)=q®, if the cost function is not too
convex (in particular, ® · 1:2), ¯rm h chooses a higher quality in equilibrium. Conversely, if the
cost function is highly convex (®>1:2), it chooses a lower quality.
This is demonstrated in Figure 3 below.
14
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Neither firm has PP
Low firm has PP
Figure 3: Qualities of ¯rms h (top) and ` (bottom) with convexity of marginal cost function (®)
PP provides ¯rm ` with an opportunity to penetrate an untapped market segment further to
the left than where it presently is. Hence it lowers its quality to extend its reach in the direction of
decreasing consumer type. As a competitive response to di®erentiate itself, ¯rm h initially moves
to the right as long as moving away is relatively inexpensive due to low convexity of its costs.
But when the costs start increasing at a much faster rate, the potential loss per unit of market
share on the right is outweighed by the gains from moving to the left. By moving towards the low
quality ¯rm, h increases the uncontested portion of its market share on the right where it faces no
competition from `. Thus, for a wide range of ®, both ¯rms reduce their qualities when the PP ¯rm
chooses a low quality. Further, to give consumers a positive surplus and remain competitive, ¯rm
h also reduces its price, after lowering its quality. We show in Section 7 that the non-monotonicity
of `0s price also implies that consumers are worse o® than in the no-PP case.
5.2 PP Firm O®ers High Quality








equilibrium prices. In this case, ¯rm h knows the type of each consumer, and is hence willing to
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h if need be.
At stage 3, ¯rm ` (which does not have PP in this case) will operate in a market segment [µh
` ;µh
h],
and ¯rm h in a market segment [µh
h;1]. Consider ¯rst the location of the marginal consumer µh
h,
who is indi®erent between buying from either ¯rm. This consumer must obtain the same utility
from either product. If ph
`(µh
h) >c h
` ,t h e n¯ r m` would lower its price for this consumer, to ensure
that he strictly prefers to buy product `. Hence, it must be that ph
` (µh
h)=ch
` . Therefore, this

















` is de¯ned by the consumer who is indi®erent between buying product ` and not
c o n s u m i n ga ta l l .A g a i n ,i tm u s tb et h a tph
`(µh
` )=ch
` ,e l s e¯ r m` could increase its pro¯t by reducing






























































Now, consider the choice of qualities at stage 1. Suppose ¯rm ` chooses q`, and ¯rm hq h.
Further, suppose ¯rm ` chooses ph
` optimally, given the two qualities. Then, the pro¯t function of





















` ) . The corresponding ¯rst-order con-

































=0 ( 8 )
Let rh
h(qh
` ), the solution to this equation, denote the reaction function for ¯rm h.
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` ). The corresponding ¯rst-order





































h) = 0. Hence, the optimal quality of ¯rm `, qh
`
¤ is









` )) = 0: (10)
Let r`
h(qh
h), the solution to this equation, denote the reaction function for ¯rm `.
Proposition 6 Suppose both ¯rms are at the no-PP qualities, qn
h;q n
` .I f¯ r mh now acquires PP,
compared to the no-PP case, (i) ¯rm ` charges a lower price: ph
` <p n
` , and (ii) if ¯rm ` remains
at its original quality, qn
` ,t h e n¯ r mh chooses a higher quality.
Of course, in equilibrium, both ¯rms change their qualities from the no-PP case. We expect the
price of ¯rm ` to be lower, and the quality of ¯rm h to be lower. What quality does ¯rm ` choose?
Similar to the previous case, if the cost function is not too convex (in particular, ® · 1:55), ¯rm `
chooses a lower quality in equilibrium. Conversely, if the cost function is highly convex (®>1:55),
it chooses a higher quality.
Thus, for a wide range of ®, both ¯rms increase their qualities when the PP ¯rm chooses a
higher quality. Further, the price of ¯rm ` falls. We show in Section 7 that this implies that
consumers are better o® than in the no-PP case.
The ¯rm with PP has a strategic advantage, since it knows consumer valuations and can price
at marginal cost for the threshold consumer. To maximize this strategic advantage, it seeks to
di®erentiate itself further from the other ¯rm and avoid head-to-head competition. As long as
costs are increasing at a moderate rate, the non-PP ¯rm seeks to increase product di®erentiation
by moving away. However when cost function becomes steep, the non-PP ¯rm seeks to reduce
quality di®erentiation and come closer to the PP ¯rm in the quality space. That is, if the PP
¯rm has a low quality, in equilibrium, both ¯rms end up with lower qualities than previously. The
converse outcome occurs if the PP ¯rm chooses high quality; that is, in equilibrium both ¯rms end
up with higher qualities.
17
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Neither firm has PP
High firm has PP
Figure 4: Qualities of ¯rms h (top) and ` (bottom) with convexity of marginal cost function (®)
We further note that, when only one ¯rm has PP, regardless of whether it chooses a high or
low quality, the other ¯rm o®ers a lower price than the corresponding price in the case in which
neither ¯rm has PP. Since it knows that PP immediately equips the other ¯rm with an ability to
lower prices wherever necessary, the initial strategic response by the non-PP ¯rm, is to lower its
own price in order to remain competitive.
6B o t h F i r m s h a v e P P
Suppose, as before, that ¯rm h chooses qb
h and ¯rm ` chooses qb




















.R e c a l lt h a t¯ r mh sells to consumers in the region [µb
h;1] and ¯rm 2 in the region [µb
`;µ b
h].
As before, ^ µ represents the point beyond which ¯rms compete for consumers, so that the price
o®ered by the low ¯rm is declining in consumer type.
Consider stage 2 of this game, where the ¯rms choose their price schedule, given qualities qb
h;q b
`.







h)dµ.T h em a x i m a lp r i c e¯ r mh can
charge any consumer µ is the price at which he is exactly indi®erent between buying the low quality
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Notice that this is exactly the same as the pro¯t function of ¯rm h when only ¯rm ` has PP,
equation (5). Hence, it follows that the reaction function of ¯rm h is identical to that expressed by
equation (5).








`)dµ. Now, as before, in
the region [µb
`;^ µ], ¯rm ` faces no e®ective competition from ¯rm h (since these consumers will not
buy good h even at a price cb
h). Hence, in this region, it charges pb
`(µ)=µqb
`. In the region [^ µ;µb
h],
¯rm h is willing to price as low as cb









































Notice that this pro¯t function is exactly the same as the pro¯t function of ¯rm ` when only ¯rm
h has PP. Hence, it follows that its reaction function is identical to equation (9).
To compare the qualities in this case with the cases in which only one ¯rm has PP, we parame-
terize the cost function as c(q)=Aq®.F o r®>1, this function is convex. We assume that A> 1
®.
This function satis¯es assumption 1.
We show that both ¯rms o®er a higher quality than in the case in which only ¯rm ` has PP,
but o®er a lower quality than in the case in which only ¯rm h has PP. Interestingly, compared to
t h ec a s ew h e nn e i t h e r¯ r mh a dP P ,w eo b s e r v et h a tt h eh i g hq u a l i t y¯ r ml o w e r si t sq u a l i t ya n dt h e
low quality ¯rm raises its quality. This implies that both ¯rms actually come closer to each other.
The intensi¯ed competition leaves both ¯rms worse o®.
Proposition 7 Suppose c(q)=Aq®,w h e r e®>1 and A> 1
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Low firm has PP
Neither firm has PP



































Both firms have PP
 High firm has PP
Figure 5: Pro¯t of Firm ` when Firm h does not (left) and does (right) have PP
7O b s e r v a t i o n s
In this section, we examine which ¯rms are likely to adopt PP, and the resultant consumer welfare.
Suppose neither ¯rm has PP. We assume that after one or both ¯rms adopt PP, the quality rankings
of the ¯rms do not change. That is, the low quality ¯rm when neither ¯rm has PP remains the low
quality ¯rm when one or both ¯rms have PP. Quality levels are tantamount to brand equity, and
signi¯cant changes to quality are likely to be costly. This is especially true when quality rankings
are reversed. By contrast, local or marginal changes to quality can be made in continuous fashion.
Hence, we now consider ¯rm ` acquiring PP, or ¯rm h acquiring PP, or both.
We demonstrate these observations numerically in the model, assuming a cost function c(q)=q®
(that is, A =1 ) .
Observation 2 For ® 2 [1;4], it is a dominant strategy for ¯rm ` to acquire PP. That is, regardless
of whether ¯rm h has PP, ¯rm ` should adopt PP.
Figure 5 demonstrates the increase in pro¯t to ¯rm ` when it acquires PP. The ¯gure on the left
considers the case of neither ¯rm having PP, and the ¯gure on the right the case of ¯rm h having
PP.
We emphasize that the cost of building or acquiring a personalized pricing technology is not
factored into this calculation. Such a cost can be incorporated as follows. The vertical line between
the dashed and shaded line indicates the gain to ¯rm ` from PP. It will adopt PP if and only if this
20
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High firm has PP
Neither firm has PP







































Both firms have PP
Low firm has PP
Figure 6: Pro¯t of Firm h when Firm ` does not (left) and does (right) have PP
gap exceeds the ¯xed cost of adopting PP.
Observation 3 Regardless of whether ¯rm ` has PP, ¯rm h should adopt PP only if the cost
function is not too convex. In particular, there exists an ^ ® 2 [2:5;3] such that, if ®>^ ®, and ¯rm
h acquires PP, its pro¯ts decrease.
Figure 6 demonstrates this.
How can the pro¯t of ¯rm h decrease when it acquires PP? Recall that, when ¯rm h acquires
PP and ¯rm ` does not have PP, ¯rm ` responds by reducing its price. This induces ¯rm h to
increase its quality. Increasing quality is especially costly when the cost function is steep; indeed,
it is costly enough in this case to outweigh the bene¯ts of charging consumers their willingness to
pay. A similar intuition holds when ¯rm ` has PP. If ¯rm h acquires PP in this situation, the new
equilibrium sees both ¯rms at a higher quality, which is again correspondingly costly for ¯rm h.
Again, note that this result does not factor in a cost for acquiring PP. With such a cost, ¯rm h has
even less incentive to acquire PP.
Observation 4 If both ¯rms acquire PP, then, for low ®, both ¯rms have higher pro¯ts compared to
the case when neither ¯rm has PP. However, for ® 2 [2;3], both ¯rms have lower pro¯ts, compared
to when neither ¯rm has PP. However the market shares increase for both ¯rms, for all ®.
The result on pro¯ts can be seen by comparing the pro¯ts of the two ¯rms in Figures 5 and 6,
between the cases \Neither ¯rm has PP" and \Both ¯rms have PP." Personalized pricing intensi¯es
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Observation 5 Consumer surplus is higher when both ¯rms have PP, as compared to any of the
other cases.
This points out the bene¯ts of competition when there is ¯rst-degree price discrimination, in
contrast to the monopoly case, in which consumer surplus is zero.7












`) to its consumers. Compare





If ¯rm ` now acquires PP, the greater competition leads to a lower price for consumers of ¯rm h,
and a corresponding increase in welfare. Consumer surplus falls (compared to the no personalized
pricing case) if the PP ¯rm has low quality, but rises if the PP ¯rm has high quality. When ¯rm
` has PP, it extends its market reach to a segment previously untapped, since it can price as low
as marginal cost. However, a segment of its consumers receive no surplus, since they pay a price
exactly equal to their willingness to pay. Conversely, if ¯rm h has PP, it faces competition from
¯rm ` throughout its market segment, so is forced to concede some surplus to consumers. In fact
consumer surplus is highest when both ¯rms have PP. This scenario represents the case of most
intense competition between the two ¯rms. Figure 7 demonstrates the consumer surplus in all the
cases.
Finally, in Table 1, we consider the quadratic cost case (c(q)=q2) case in greater detail, to
p r o v i d es o m eb e n c h m a r k so np r i c e sw h e n¯ r m sh a v eP P .N o t i c et h a tt h er e s u l t si nt h ec a s ew h e n
neither ¯rm has PP correspond exactly to those of Moorthy (1988). The average price displayed in
the table is the average of the prices paid by di®erent consumers for the good. For example, in the
case when neither ¯rm has PP, of course, all consumers pay the same price. When ¯rm ` has PP,
p`
h =0 :201, p`
`(µ)=0 :164µ for µ 2 [0:164;0:517], and p`
`(µ)=0 :201 ¡ 0:224µ for µ 2 [0:517;0:776].
This leads to a maximum price of 0:0848 and a minimum one of 0:0269. When both ¯rms have
PP, because of the intensi¯ed competition the average price of both ¯rms is the lowest of all cases.
7Bhaskar and To (2002) obtain a similar result in their framework.
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Both firms have PP
High firm has PP
Neither firm has PP
Low firm has PP
Figure 7: Consumer Surplus in Each of the 4 Cases
Further, their overall market coverage is at its highest. Hence, consumer surplus is maximized in
this case.
Neither ¯rm has PP Firm ` has PP Firm h has PP Both ¯rms have PP
Firm h,F i r m` Firm h,F i r m` Firm h,F i r m` Firm h,F i r m`
Qualities 0.409, 0.199 0.388, 0.164 0.444, 0.222 0.4, 0.2
Market Shares 0.28, 0.35 0.224, 0.612 0.444, 0.222 0.4, 0.4
Average Price 0.227, 0.075 0.201, 0.056 0.247, 0.074 0.2, 0.02
Pro¯ts 0.0164, 0.012 0.0112, 0.0177 0.022, 0.0055 0.016,0.008
Table 1: Summary of equilibrium results when c(q)=q2
8 Discussion
In this section we derive managerial implications of our results. Electronic retailers are beginning
to explore the potential bene¯ts of \smarter pricing " on the Internet and as such are pursuing
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about consumer needs and willingness to pay can customize their o®erings and prices to give their
consumers exactly what they want, at exactly the price they are willing to bear.
In a recent survey of online retailers (Johnson, 2000), 57% of retailers surveyed planned to
o®er multiple prices for the same item, and 71% expected to have preferred pricing for regular
consumers. The credit rating agency Experian has launched a software package that enables e-
commerce sellers to recognize customers instantly. It can send their pro¯le to retailers, including
details of their wealth and the products they are most likely to buy. A number of ¯nancial services
companies are using similar technology to price products and deliver services to their banking and
credit card consumers. Capital One uses pro¯les based on hundreds of variables to tailor products
and prices for speci¯c clients (see McDonnell 2001). How this might impact other major players
such as First Union Bank and Bank of America and their incentives to invest in personalized pricing
technologies is worth pondering about.
Our model points out certain interesting pricing strategies for ¯rms. If the low quality ¯rm
deploys PP then it is optimal for it to use a non monotonic price schedule. This result implies that
certain high valuation consumers are charged lower prices than some lower valuation consumers.
This counter-intuitive result holds because in a segment of high valuation consumers, the ¯rm
with PP ¯nds itself competing with a high quality ¯rm (that does not have PP). To induce these
consumers to buy its product, the ¯rm needs a declining price schedule. Conversely, in a segment
of the market with low valuations, the PP ¯rm is a local monopolist, and can a®ord to charge
consumers exactly their willingness to pay.
It is important to note that given these technologies, it is easy to get into a spiraling price
war. In order to avoid this, ¯rms need to increase product di®erentiation either by providing some
value added services or by adding features to the product to enhance its durability or functionality.
Retailers can charge quality-sensitive shoppers premium prices if the overall value proposition is
clearly exposed and appealing enough. Compared to Buy.com, Amazon provides added features
such as customized book recommendations, editorial reviews, and easy site navigability.
While ours is a static model, the intuition extends to a dynamic setting, in which ¯rms can
react to each other's actions. Suppose ¯rst that there is no lag in acquiring PP, so that ¯rms can
immediately respond to each other's actions. Our results in the static model suggest that a low
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However, in a scenario in which the high quality ¯rm can observe its action and respond, a low
quality ¯rm may prefer to not adopt PP. Suppose, for example, that ® 2 [1:5;3], so that costs are
only moderately convex. In this scenario, if either ¯rm adopts PP, it is a best response for the
other ¯rm to follow suit. However, both ¯rms are better o® in the scenario where neither has PP,
as compared to both having PP. Hence, it is optimal for neither ¯rm to adopt PP. Conversely, if
®>3, only the low quality ¯rm will adopt PP, since the high quality ¯rm reduces its own pro¯t
by adopting PP.
On the other hand, if adopting PP requires considerable lead time, an early adopter can exploit
its ¯rst mover advantage to increase pro¯ts in the interim period before any competitor can follow.
This o®ers an extra incentive to adopt PP. Compared to the previous paragraph, ¯rms should now
adopt PP for a wider range of ®.
We also identify the diverse scenarios under which ¯rms make di®erent product quality choices,
given that one ¯rm has decided to acquire PP. When a low quality ¯rm acquires PP, its best response
is to lower its quality level. This can be done through removal of additional product features or
value-added services. In such a scenario the high quality ¯rm is better o® by also reducing its
quality level. Conversely, if the high quality ¯rm acquires PP, both ¯rms should provide additional
product features or services to increase their quality levels. However when both ¯rms decide to
acquire PP, the manner in which they would change their qualities also merits attention. If the
high quality ¯rm has PP and the low quality ¯rm decides to deploy PP as well, then both ¯rms
should reduce their quality levels. Conversely if the low quality ¯rm has PP and the high quality
¯rm decides to acquire it, then both ¯rms should raise their quality levels.
Finally, our model also demonstrates that consumers would bene¯t if higher quality ¯rms adopt
PP. In the event that all ¯rms adopt PP, consumers would bene¯t the most. Thus we conclude
that strategies approaching ¯rst degree price discrimination on the Internet should eventually lead
to an overall increase in consumer welfare, which is quite in contrast to popular perceptions.
Our primary objective in this paper has been to provide an analytical framework to investigate
the competitive implications of technologies which allow for precise inferring of consumers' valua-
tions for ¯rms' products and their ability to charge di®erent prices from di®erent consumers plus
the ¯rms' resultant choice of product di®erentiation.
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Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011Our model of vertical di®erentiation in the online retail B2C market, shows how ¯rst degree
price discrimination on the Internet will a®ect ¯rms' choice of quality or service di®erentiation in
a competitive scenario. There are quite a few extensions which we have not considered but can be
worked upon. In particular, we have not incorporated product customization in our model. Firms
may be able to combine PP with customization and then ¯rms can choose locations with respect
to the degree of customization as well.8
9A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1














Consider ¯rst the optimal choice of pn









2 . The function is obviously concave in p, so this yields a maximum. Substituting


























m(q) for all q, it must be that ¼d
m and ¼n
m have the same maximizer; that is,
qd = qm.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Suppose that q1 = q2. If neither ¯rm has access to PP, the Proposition is immediate. Consider
the case that ¯rm 1 has PP, and ¯rm 2 does not. Suppose p2 > 0. Firm 1 will never charge
p1(µ) >p 2 to any consumer µ, since the consumer will buy product 2 instead. Further, by the usual
Bertrand argument, ¯rm 1 will not charge p1(µ)=p2 either. By charging a price ² below p2,¯ r m
1 ensures that consumer µ buys its product.
8We are grateful to seminar participants at WISE 2001 and Carnegie Mellon University, and to Kannan Srinivasan
for helpful comments. All errors remain our own responsibility.
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charging p2 2 (0;p 1(µ)). Hence, the only equilibrium is the Bertrand one, p1(µ)=p2 = c(q1) for all
consumers µ.
The same argument holds if ¯rm 2 has PP instead of ¯rm 1. Consider next the case in which
both ¯rms have PP. The argument above then applies to each consumer type µ:i tm u s tb et h a t ,
for each µ 2 [0;1], p1(µ)=p2(µ)=c(q1).
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
From the de¯nitions of µn
h and µn
l ,t h ep r o ¯ to f¯ r mh is ¼n










with respect to pn











< 0, so we have a maximum.















` ). Di®erentiating with respect to pn
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Consider ¯rm h ¯rst. Its pro¯t at stage 2, if it charges price ph,i s¼`






























Next, consider ¯rm `.F i r m` will set its price for each consumer, p`
`(µ), as high as possible to
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µq`
` ¡ p`
`(µ) ¸ 0; or p`
`(µ) · µq`
`:




`)f o re a c hc o n s u m e r ,e l s ei tm a k e sal o s so nt h a tc o n s u m e r ,








The ¯rst term in the latter inequality is de¯ned by the consumer's reservation utility (i.e., zero),
and the second term can be interpreted as his incentive compatibility constraint: if this is violated,
then he buys product h instead.





as de¯ned, it is immediate that p`
h ¡ µ(q`
h ¡ q`
`) >µ q `




`) <µ q `
` for µ<^ µ. The pricing function for ¯rm ` now follows.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
Consider equation (6), which de¯nes q`





























< 1. Since c`
h <p `









h)0 < 1. Since q`
` <q `




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Recall that Ã`(q`
h;q`
`) is the left-hand side of equation (3), the ¯rst-order condition for ¯rm `.
Here, p`
h is a function of q`
h;q`
` (that is, we assume p`
h






















































2 > 0; since (c`









` (else ¯rm ` has zero sales).
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Now, suppose ¯rm ` has chosen an optimal quality, and ¯rm h now increases q`
h. Then, at the
original optimal quality of ¯rm `, Ã`(q`
h;q`
`) > 0. Hence, to reach Ã` =0 ,¯ r m` must increase its




`), de¯ned as the left-hand side of equation (5, the ¯rst order condition





































Now, suppose ¯rm h h a sc h o s e na no p t i m a lq u a l i t y ,a n d¯ r m` now increases q`
`. Then, at the
original optimal quality of ¯rm h, Ãh(q`
h;q`
`) > 0. Hence, to reach Ãh =0 ,¯ r mh must increase its
quality. Hence, its reaction function, r`
h, is upward-sloping.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5





` .G i v e npn
h from Lemma 1 and p`
h from Proposition 3, we have p`
h <p n
























































` ) < 0:
Consider the last inequality. qn
h >q n
` ,a n dcn
` · qn















h < 0. Hence, the last inequality holds, so that p`
h <p n
h.

























`), so the second term






35 Ghose et al.: Personalized Pricing and Quality Differentiation on the Internet
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011Now, suppose the ¯rms choose their no-PP quality levels, qn
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` .I f ¯ r m h keeps its quality
level at qn
h and reduces its price from pn
h to p`
h,w ew i l lh a v eÃ` > 0. Hence, ¯rm ` must reduce its
quality to ensure that Ã` =0 .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n 6
We proceed with a series of steps.





` . Then, ph
` <p n
` .
P r o o fo fS t e p1 :G i v e npn
h from Lemma 1 and ph
` from equation 7, we have p`
h <p n




































































¡ 1)) < 0
Consider the last inequality. qn
h >q n
` ,a n dcn
h · qn
















` ) ¡ 1)) < 0. Hence, the last inequality holds, so that ph
` <p n
` .
Step 2:S u p p o s e¯ r m` chooses a quality q` = qn
` , but reduces its price from pn
` to ph
` . Then, ¯rm
h increases its quality in response to the lowering of the price of the low quality ¯rm.











` ) . Consider rh(q`) the reaction function for ¯rm h.
Taking the partial of this expression with respect to ph






























The ¯rst term is clearly negative. From the convexity of the cost function, the second term < 0,
from which the inequality holds.
Step 3: The reaction functions rh
l is upward sloping. Hence, when the high ¯rm increases its quality
qh
h, the low ¯rm will increase qh
` .
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Recall that Ã`(qh
h;q h
` ) is the left-hand side of equation (9), the ¯rst-order condition for ¯rm `.
Here, ph
` is a function of qh
h;qh
` (that is, we assume ph





































so that to reach Ã` =0 ,¯ r m` must increase its quality.
Step 4: The reaction function rh
h is upward sloping. That is, when the low ¯rm increases its quality
qh
` the high ¯rm will increase qh
h.
Proof of Step 4: Recall equation (8), the ¯rst order condition of ¯rm h. Here, again ph
` is a function
of qh
h;q h
` (that is, we assume ph





































Consider the ¯rst term. ch
h <q h
h(ch
h)0 and from lemma 2 c0
` < 1. So the ¯rst term is > 0.





































Hence, to reach Ãh =0 ,¯ r mh must increase its quality.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7





¤. Then, ¯rm ` will increase its quality if ¯rm h also has PP.




¤, are the solutions to the two equations (6) and (4), respectively.
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h)0 +2 ( c`














Now, the ¯rst term on the right-hand side is clearly positive. Consider the second term. Using


















®(1 + ®lnqh) ¡ q`
®(1 + ®lnq`):
Now, the function q®(1 + ®lnq)i si n c r e a s i n gi nq, since both terms are increasing in q. Hence,
Á0(®) > 0. Therefore, Á(®) > 0 for all ®>1.
Hence, Ã`(q`
h;q h
` ) > 0. Therefore, starting with the case in which ¯rm ` has PP, if ¯rm h
acquires PP, ¯rm ` will increase its quality, to reach Ã` =0 .
Step 2: From the proofs of Propositions 4 and 6, it follows that both reaction functions are upward-
sloping, so that, in response to ¯rm ` increasing its quality, ¯rm h will increase its own quality, and









Step 3: Next, suppose both ¯rms o®er the quality levels qh
h;qh
` , the equilibrium qualities when only
¯rm h has PP. We show that ¯rm h will decrease its quality in this instance if ¯rm ` also has PP.


























¤, which are the solutions to the two equations (8) and (10),
respectively.
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` ,e l s e¯ r mh has zero sales. Since
ph
` >c h















Therefore, at the qualities (qh
h;qh
` ), Ãh < 0. Hence, to reach a quality at which Ãh(qb
h;qb
`)=0 ,
¯rm h must decrease its quality. Since both reaction functions are upward sloping, ¯rm ` will also
decrease its quality.
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